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RATIONING THE INFINITE 
Leonard M. Niehoff* 
MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS. By 
C. Edwin Baker. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 
256. Cloth, $68; paper, $23.99. 
INTRODUCTION 
While in the course of reading the book reviewed here, I wandered into a 
local coffee shop to supplement my morning dose of caffeine. I put the book 
down so I could fish some money from my pocket. The young man behind 
the counter tapped the cover with his finger and said, "Hey, great book." 
This sort of remark captures a reviewer's attention, and so I asked, "Why do 
you think so?" His initial deer-in-the-headlights expression gradually gave 
way to something like self-confidence; he furrowed his brow and tightened 
his lips and then responded, "The guy has lots of ideas." 
And so he does. Over the past two decades, C. Edwin Baker' has closely 
considered the various forces that threaten the independence of the press and 
its unique contribution to a free and democratic society. In Human Liberty 
and Freedom of Speech,2 he discussed how abuses and excesses of govern­
mental power threaten freedom of expression and of the press. In 
Advertising and a Democratic Press,3 he explored how the press's depend­
ence on advertising weakens the performance of the institution and distorts 
the content of its publications. In Media, Markets, and Democracy,4 he in­
vestigated the relationship between media economics and democratic theory. 
Now, in his most recent book, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why 
Ownership Matters, Baker considers how media ownership--particularly 
the concentration of ownership--affects the ability of the press to fulfill its 
charge under the First Amendment. 
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Media Concentration and Democracy is  divided into five chapters. In 
the first chapter, Baker sets forth three arguments for the proposition that the 
increasing concentration of media ownership compromises the role of a free 
press within a democratic society and, therefore, requires a regulatory re­
sponse. Part I of this Review describes those three arguments and contends 
that, although they offer some inventive reconceptualizations of the relation­
ship between media and democracy, they ultimately lack the theoretical 
rigor and empirical substantiation necessary to justify significant changes in 
media-ownership policy. In short, Part I maintains that B aker bears a burden 
of proof and does not carry it. 
In the next three chapters, B aker considers objections that might be 
raised to his arguments. Part II of this Review questions whether B aker fair­
ly frames those rebuttal arguments and whether he offers sufficient support 
for his rejection of them. In particular, Part II challenges Baker's fairly dis­
missive view of the impact that new media, especially as conveyed through 
the internet, may have on the very issue his book seeks to address. 
In his final chapter, Baker proposes possible policy responses to the 
problems created by media concentration. Part III of this Review explores 
the various shortcomings of these proposals. Part III focuses on some appar­
ent inconsistencies within Baker's arguments and highlights the absence of 
the practical details needed to effect-or even evaluate-the changes he 
proposes. 
As this summary suggests, this Review raises a number of objections to 
B aker's arguments and proposals. Furthermore, this Review raises the fun­
damental question of whether Baker's central operating assumption-that 
media is a scarce resource that should be fairly distributed-remains timely 
in light of the far-reaching and fast-paced changes wrought by the internet. 
Nevertheless, this Review also recognizes that, as with B aker's prior works, 
Media Concentration and Democracy makes a serious contribution to the 
discussion of the political, social, and economic dynamics that challenge the 
existence of a strong and independent media. Media Concentration and 
Democracy does a better job of raising questions than of answering them, 
but this does not prevent it from adding meaningfully to the debate sur­
rounding these issues. 
I. BAKER'S THREE REASONS FOR OPPOSING MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
CONCENTRATION: ARGUING FROM POWER, PROCESS, AND PREDICTION 
In Chapter One, Baker describes what he sees as "the three main reasons 
for opposing ownership concentration."5 His first reason rests on a "norma­
tive conception of democracy" in which political power is equally 
distributed (p. 6). Baker invokes the "one-person/one-vote institutional 
5. P. 6. Baker identifies a number of other reasons as well. For example, he argues that 
conglomerates are particularly vulnerable to outside pressures and internal conflicts of interest. Pp. 
37-4 1 .  This Review focuses on the three arguments Baker identifies as central to his claims about 
ownership concentration. 
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principle" as a familiar expression of this concept, and suggests that com­
municative power should be distributed in a similarly egalitarian manner.6 
His second argument contends that media dispersal is necessary to check 
governmental authority and protect society from its abuse (pp. 16-19). His 
third reason is that evenly dispersed media ownership produces higher qual­
ity journalism (pp. 28-37). Although Baker's rationales merit consideration, 
I believe he does an inadequate job of defending them, both theoretically 
and empirically. 
A. Baker 's Three Reasons 
Baker's first argument for promoting media distribution is based in a 
concept of normative democracy and what Baker calls "communicative 
power," by which he means the power to convey preferences, views, and 
visions and thereby shape public opinion (p. 7). Baker argues that, "[a]s ap­
plied to media ownership, this [democratic distribution principle for 
communicative power] can be plausibly interpreted structurally as requiring 
. . .  a maximum dispersal of media ownership" (p. 7). Baker concedes that 
this argument finds its support not in empirical evidence but in normative 
appeal (p. 8). B ut this does not trouble him because he believes that the 
normative force of this principle makes it a free-standing basis to oppose 
ownership concentration: "the democratic distribution principle is always a 
proper, whether or not a conclusive, reason to oppose concentration and fa­
vor media ownership dispersal" (p. 10). 
B aker alternatively frames the "democratic distribution principle" as an 
"inclusionary goal" (p. 11). He contends that "[o]wnership should be dis­
tributed in a manner that results in no one feeling that discourses of groups 
with which she identifies are neglected or subordinated" (p. 11). He main­
tains that "all groups should have a real share and no one group or 
individual should have too inordinate a share of media power" (p. I 1). And 
he posits that "[t]his goal is typically furthered by maximum dispersal of 
ownership" (p. 11). 
Baker's second argument is that dispersal of media ownership prevents 
the exercise of "enormous, unequal and hence undemocratic, largely un­
checked, potentially irresponsible power" (p. 16). He notes that our 
constitutional structure establishes a separation of powers to reduce the risk 
of abuses by the government (p. 16). He argues the same considerations ap­
ply with respect to the structure of the fourth estate: "[t]he widest possible 
dispersal of media power reduces the risk of the abuse of communicative 
power in choosing or controlling the government."7 As with his egalitarian 
distribution argument, he describes the significance of this 
6. P. 6. Baker acknowledges that conception and reality differ, and that many factors result 
in the unequal distribution of political power. P. 6. 
7. P. 16. Baker compares this normative impulse supporting media dispersal with that sup­
porting campaign finance reform, arguing that in both cases the goal is "to prevent one person or a 
small group from being able to use the power of wealth to dominate the (electoral) public sphere." P. 
1 7. 
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approach by reference to process, "independent of any commodity that the 
media produces and distributes on a day-to-day basis" (p. 16). And, as with 
his egalitarian distribution argument, he does not rely upon empirical evi­
dence but rather declares that the danger he describes "is a simple matter of 
logic."8 
Baker's third argument is that large media conglomerates, particularly 
publicly traded ones, are inclined both to focus on profit making, and to do 
so at the expense of investment in "news and other cultural media content 
that people want and citizens need" (p. 29). In other words, he claims that 
ownership concentration results in a decline in content quality. Baker bases 
this claim on what he calls "sociologically and structurally based predic­
tions" (p. 29). 
One such prediction is that executives at large media companies will 
seek to maximize profits because that is the primary basis on which they are 
rewarded (p. 33). Baker argues this is particularly true when those running 
media corporations are not themselves journalists (p. 33). Baker contrasts 
these executives with the heads or owners of smaller entities, who he says 
are "likely to identify more often with the quality of their firm's journalistic 
efforts and the paper or station's service to their communities" (p. 34). 
Another prediction is that corporations that acquire other businesses will 
seek to maximize profits in order to cover the debt created by the purchase 
and to make the merger decision appear wise (p. 35). Baker believes some 
empirical evidence supports these predictions, though he candidly describes 
it as "limited and messy" (p. 35). "Still," he maintains, "the most obvious 
plot line is: publicly traded companies fire journalists, degrade quality, and 
increase profits" (p. 36). 
Baker's reasons for opposing media ownership thus share two related 
characteristics :  they rest on arguments from theory and logic, and they dis­
count the significance of empirical data. This approach causes problems for 
Baker. Readers may not share his dismissive view of the relevancy of em­
pirical evidence to the questions at hand. And, perhaps more importantly, 
Baker's approach shifts the burden of his argument to his theoretical con­
structs, which do not hold up particularly well under close scrutiny. 
B. A Critique of Pure Reasons: Failings of Theory and Evidence 
Baker's first argument, regarding normative democratic values, has 
some appeal, but it is not adequately developed or defended. Surely most 
people would agree that inclusion represents a democratic value. But, as 
Baker notes, so does the familiar principle that our democracy should foster 
free competition within the marketplace of ideas.9 Baker aptly 
8. P. 1 9. Although Baker does not base his argument on empirical data, he does cite in­
stances in German and Italian history where the conglomeration of media power significantly aided 
the ascendancy of a favored political figure. P. 1 8. 
9. The model of the marketplace of ideas, in which truth and falsity are allowed to compete 
with the expectation that the former will ordinarily prevail, has a distinguished intellectual history. 
The theme is reflected in JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITJCA (London, 1 644), JOHN LocKE, A LEITER 
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describes the driving rationale (or, as he labels it, the "epistemological 
hope") behind the marketplace of ideas model: "those speakers with better 
arguments will prevail over those without," a notion that "presumably re­
quires that these better arguments ultimately gather larger audiences" (p. 
11). Of course, this value of free competition within the marketplace con­
flicts with the value of inclusion-at least insofar as the former will result in 
the marginalization, if not the elimination, of some views and opinions. If, 
as Baker seems to believe, the value of inclusion trumps the value of a free­
wheeling and largely unregulated market, then he needs to adequately ex­
plain why and to what extent this is so. 
Baker makes an effort to offer such an explanation in his second chapter. 
His argument rests largely on the rejection of the marketplace of ideas 
model as naive and misguided. He contends that "[t]he view that the unregu­
lated marketplace of ideas can be expected to arrive at anything reasonably 
treated as 'truth' is simply implausible unless the result, whatever it is, is 
simply defined as 'truth' by fiat-that is, because it resulted from this proc­
ess" (pp. 84-85). He argues that "[o]nly misguided premises concerning the 
objectivity of truth, combined with extreme assumptions about the extent of 
human rationality, would justify a belief in the routine superiority of an un­
regulated marketplace of ideas for the purposes of reaching truth" (p. 85). 
I share some of Baker's skepticism about the marketplace of ideas mod­
el. Still, this part of Baker's argument seems to build up a straw man just to 
knock it down. Certainly, the marketplace of ideas model depends upon a 
broadly descriptive and necessarily imprecise metaphor. And, certainly, it is 
easy to think of instances where the marketplace has failed us and bad ideas 
have prevailed over better ones. But these shortcomings pale in comparison 
to the mischief wrought by conceptual models that have allowed for gov­
ernmental regulation of ideas and their expression. The question, therefore, 
is not whether the marketplace of ideas model is perfect and consistently 
right; rather, the question is whether that model is less imperfect than mod­
els that allow for greater governmental power over the media. Baker does 
not frame the question correctly, and his answer suffers accordingly. 
Furthermore, Baker's opposition to the marketplace of ideas model de­
pends upon a shift in orientation that is easy to miss but deeply problematic. 
In rejecting the marketplace of ideas, Baker uses language with a heavily 
egalitarian sensibility, which naturally evokes sympathy. He repeatedly al­
ludes to the interest in having "all people," "all groups," and "any part of 
society" heard (p. 11). He notes that "[u]seful challenges" to the accepted 
wisdom "usually come from the margins" (p. 11). But his argument evokes 
less sympathy, indeed seems patently flawed, if we turn the focus away from 
CONCERNING TOLERATION (London, Awnsham Churchill 1 689), and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIB­
ERTY (London, J.W. Parker & Son 1 859). Its most famous expression in American law comes in 
Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, where he declared that "the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 250 U.S. 6 16, 630 
( 19 19) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a general history of the model, see T. BARTON CARTER ET AL, 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 38-43 ( 10th ed. 
2008). For a close and critical analysis of the shortcomings of the model, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, 
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPffiCAL ENQUIRY 1 9-30 ( 1982). 
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people and back to ideas. Some ideas-such as Holocaust denial, slavery, 
the inherent weakness of women, and the inferiority of racial minorities­
have been pushed to the margins by informed public discourse, and we do 
not mourn this development as a form of disenfranchisement. A marketplace 
of ideas that embraces everything and results in the marginalization of noth­
ing offers little promise of progress. 
But, even if we accept Baker's focus on people rather than ideas, his ar­
gument comes up wanting because he does not explain how his conclusion 
follows from his premise. Media-ownership dispersal may result in the in­
clusion of voices that would otherwise be excluded; or it may not. 
Ownership dispersal and the inclusion of diverse voices are in fact logically 
distinct, and while numerically increased distribution and inclusion are not 
unrelated, the latter certainly does not necessarily follow from the former. io 
Whether ownership dispersal creates inclusion depends on an array of 
factual considerations with which Baker declines to engage in any depth. 
For example, economic and other barriers to entry may prevent certain 
groups from participating in ownership even if ownership is dispersed. Bak­
er appears to admit as much when he acknowledges that dispersal does not 
"guarantee" the "experience of inclusion" (p. 12). Still, Baker thinks it suffi­
cient that dispersal will "more likely" have this result than concentration; 
the policy, he observes, thus stands on an "expectation" (p. 12). It seems far 
from obvious, however, that dispersal justifies even something as limited as 
an expectation. After all, if barriers to entry prohibit or limit the participa­
tion of certain groups in ownership-and there are good reasons to believe 
this is the case-then dispersal will in and of itself do nothing to remove 
those barriers. A group excluded by economic barriers will find little solace 
in the availability of more media outlets they cannot afford to purchase. 1 1  
Furthermore, even if we accept Baker's conclusion-that dispersal of 
ownership will make a "probable contribution . . .  to inclusion" (p. 12)-this 
leaves open the question of whether that salutary effect justifies the price 
exacted. This seems unanswerable in the abstract, which is where Baker 
wishes to address the issue. Granted, a "probable contribution" may suffice 
to tip the scales if one subscribes to the principle that in all (or most) cases a 
prohibition of media-ownership concentration will impose little or no bur­
den on democratic values. But reasonable people can reject such a principle 
or, at least, demand empirical data to substantiate it. For example, a reason­
able person might believe that a given concentration of media ownership 
1 0. An analogy helps make this clear. Assume, for example, that a highly competitive uni­
versity graduate program receives I 0,000 applications for one hundred spots. Even if the university 
were to increase the number of available spots by several hundred percent, doing so would not nec­
essarily assure the inclusion of all the various groups the university would like to see represented in 
its class. Certainly, an increase in the number of spots will result in a larger class; but, as a result of 
significant differences in the pool sizes of various applicant groups, it may also result in a collection 
of students that looks virtually identical to the smaller class. 
1 1 . Whether this holds true depends, of course, on the groups at issue and the factors that 
allow them to participate or preclude them from participating in ownership. Curiously. however, 
Baker maintains that his argument allows him to sidestep this complex collection of questions. P. 1 2. 
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would preserve or promote foreign bureaus, investigative-reporting teams, 
and other resource-intensive activities. 12 
Baker acknowledges that ownership dispersal may not lead to a diversity 
of content and viewpoint (p. 15). But he dismisses this concern as reflecting 
a "commodity-oriented perspective" that "miss[es] the point about why de­
mocracy requires diversity" (p. 15). Democracy, he argues, is invested in a 
notion of process that allows for egalitarian participation; "[it] does not, 
however, require that speakers provide or listeners choose a maximum (or 
any particular, high level ot) diversity in commodity content" (p. 16).  
At this point, however, Baker's argument for wider ownership distribu­
tion for the sake of wider ownership distribution seems to take on more 
weight than it can possibly bear. As noted above, wider ownership distribu­
tion-and the corresponding possibility of more diverse participation-may 
be worth something. But if we do not believe that such distribution will ac­
tually result in the participation of marginalized groups, or in the expression 
of diverse perspectives, then its value seems extraordinarily limited. Indeed, 
a critic could accuse such a celebration of wider ownership distribution as 
the worst kind of capitalist hypocrisy, on one hand exclaiming the virtues of 
inclusion and on the other hand disclaiming any likelihood of achieving the 
kinds of inclusion that matter. 
Baker's argument might survive these criticisms if he described the goal 
of inclusion as a salient consideration and made limited claims for it. In­
stead, he identifies this as "possibly the single most important[] reason to 
favor [ownership] dispersal" (p. 12) .  And he argues that "this democratic 
distributive value, without any need for complicated empirical investigations 
or controversial economic analyses, provides an entirely proper reason to 
oppose any particular media merger or to favor any policy designed to in­
crease the number or diversity of separate owners of media entities" (p. 13). 
This is an ambitious claim indeed for a value that conflicts with other rec­
ognized democratic values (such as liberty and selection within the 
marketplace of ideas) and that, as a factual matter, may or may not be served 
by an antagonism toward media-ownership concentration. 13 
Baker's second argument, which contends that media dispersal helps 
guard democracy and prevent the abuse of governmental power (p. 16), 
again requires us to think about this issue without engaging in any 
searches--or, as he sees it, "misguided search[es]"-"for empirical evi­
dence" (p. 20; emphasis added). Baker grudgingly concedes that 
"sometimes" empirical information is relevant, 14 but he argues for a very 
1 2. Indeed, Baker himself seems to acknowledge such possibilities later in his book. See p. 
1 79. 
1 3. Oddly, Baker seems to retreat from this argument as soon as he makes it. He goes on to 
say, "The important caveat . . .  is that countervail ing considerations can contextually provide a basis 
to override this normative reason for dispersal." P. 13 .  If that is so, however, then what does it mean 
to say that this normative principle provides a basis to oppose all concentrations and support all 
dispersals? 
1 4. P. 20. Baker outlines "six cautions about the use of positivist social science research." P. 
20. These are essentially warnings about the ways in which efforts to detennine empirically the 
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narrow understanding of the possible utility of such information with re­
spect to this issue. 
Baker contends that "some issues are centrally a matter of values" and 
that "[ w ]hen this is the case [then] the relevance of factual information is 
limited" (p. 20). Here, he returns to his comparison of the value of owner­
ship dispersal with the value of one-person/one-vote, noting that the "the 
basic issues, the basic controversies" with respect to the latter, "were norma­
tive, not factual" (pp. 20-21). In my view, however, this simply 
demonstrates one of the principal problems with relying on this comparison. 
After all, we do not start from an assumption that elections are a free­
wheeling marketplace in which some people will accumulate the power to 
cast more votes than other people. The principle of one-person/one-vote 
therefore does not exist in tension with a competing democratic value. 
On the other hand, we do commonly start from an assumption that free­
dom of expression is a largely unregulated enterprise where some voices 
will accumulate more authority than others. Indeed, without such power and 
acceptance, good ideas could not prevail over bad ones, and speech could 
not check the power of the government. As noted above, limiting a speaker's 
ability to accumulate power within the marketplace would be in serious ten­
sion with this value. Baker solves this difficulty by concluding that one 
value simply trumps the other. But another, and perhaps more coherent, way 
of solving it is to try to determine the respective costs and benefits and to 
make a judgment based on the weight of the evidence. The great weight of 
historical evidence militates against allowing governmental control over the 
media-this is, after all, the stuff of such constitutionally obnoxious prac­
tices as licensing of the press. A strong presumption therefore exists against 
efforts to impose such control, and those who advocate for such control bear 
the heavy burden of coming forward with persuasive empirical evidence to 
justify departing from the norm. Baker does not just fail to offer such evi­
dence; he denies any need for it. 
Baker's last argument, that media dispersal enhances media quality (pp. 
28-37), also suffers from several difficulties, one of which is perhaps most 
striking. Baker seems here to assume that the predicted compromise in qual­
ity clearly rises to a level that justifies the prevention of the activity that 
caused it. 15 This may hold true, or it may not. A marginal sacrifice in quality 
that results in a robust enterprise able to weather economic downturns may 
not strike us as an undesirable tradeoff. So citing a degradation of quality­
even if true-raises a question about the balance of interests but does not 
effects of media concentration can go astray. Ultimately, however, Baker acknowledges that "[t]hese 
six cautions should not be read as a basis for rejecting the relevance of empirical evidence." P. 26. 
Rather, these considerations simply "counsel caution" about the use of empirical evidence in this 
context. P. 26. 
15 .  Pp. 36-37. At the risk of stating the obvious, this argument must focus on the question of 
quality. After all, profit maximization is not inherently undesirable-<>r, at least, Baker has not 
shown it to be so. 
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answer it .  16 As discussed above, this conceptual mistake recurs throughout 
Baker's first chapter. 
II. REBUTTING THE REBUTTAL: 
A CRITIQUE OF BAKER' S ANSWERS TO ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS 
Some have argued that concentration of media ownership offers impor­
tant benefits, such as efficiencies that allow for cheaper prices or more 
consumer choice, higher capacity to remain independent and resist outside 
pressures, greater resources to finance expensive investigative reporting and 
litigation, and so on (pp. 49-53).  Baker expresses doubt about these argu­
ments but acknowledges that they ultimately tum on empirical 
determinations and so cannot be dismissed out of hand (pp. 52-53). Baker 
instead chooses to spend most of his energies on arguments holding that 
media concentration does not pose a threat requiring a solution. 
Baker therefore engages with arguments that media concentration is 
overstated and largely ignores arguments that the benefits of such concentra­
tion outweigh the costs. This approach results in two serious problems for 
his thesis. First, Baker's failure to contend with the facially credible 
counterargument that significant benefits may flow from ownership concen­
tration necessarily renders his own argument incomplete. Second, by 
focusing his energies in this way, he shifts the burden of his argument to his 
contention that concentration of media ownership is a serious problem de­
manding a serious remedy. Among other things, this means that Baker must 
offer a convincing explanation as to why the existence of new media does 
not fundamentally change the way we should think about communicative 
power and its concentration. In my view, he does not. 
A. Negative Critique Without Positive Counterargument 
The first argument Baker addresses holds that the media industry is 
highly competitive and not unduly concentrated, a position championed by 
economist Benjamin Compaine (p. 54). Baker makes some useful points 
about this argument, particularly regarding the importance of appropriately 
defining "the media" before attempting to evaluate its concentration. Still, 
B aker's critique ultimately seems ungrounded and academic. 
B aker notes that the data supporting media concentration relate to "the 
media as a whole," improperly combining "content producers, content de­
livery companies, content packagers, and retailers" as one "market."17 In 
addition, he points out that this argument defines undue concentration by 
reference to Chicago School antitrust standards (p. 59). He contends that 
16 .  As noted, this is only one issue that might be raised in response to Baker's argument. 
Others plainly exist, such as exploring the difficulties inherent in defining quality with respect to 
speech. 
17 .  Pp. 58-59. As Baker observed, "[o]bviously, the broader the market, the less likely that 
objectionable concentration will be found." P. 59; see also pp. 60-64. 
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those standards, which focus on whether a merger results in an entity with 
the power to control price and whether a merger serves economic efficiency, 
do not suffice as a substitute for a rich and complex analysis of the political 
and social values at stake here. 18  And he maintains that even a broader un­
derstanding of antitrust law and economics would still fail to capture the 
unique considerations at issue in the media context. 19 With respect to the last 
two points, B aker returns to the theme that a commodity-oriented approach 
to the question of media concentration (such as an approach based on anti­
trust economics) ignores the most salient considerations at issue-including 
the three non-commodity-oriented reasons for opposing such concentration 
that he champions earlier in his book (p. 75). 
Baker makes his points forcefully, and I share his skepticism about eco­
nomics as a proxy for normative policy making. Still, the impulse to 
evaluate the effects of media concentration by reference to settled and mea­
surable standards-while acknowledging that they may fail to account for 
some softer values we would ideally incorporate into our analysis-has 
some allure. Indeed, B aker inadvertently makes j ust this point when he lists 
the types of questions he says antitrust analysis fails to address, such as "[i]s 
media's communicative power distributed in ways that are democratically 
fair?" and "[i]s it distributed in ways likely to lead to better and safer politi­
cal and social processes . . .  ?" (p. 75). Readers may agree with B aker that 
the Chicago School approach seems unsatisfactorily crabbed and simplistic, 
but they may also conclude that his own approach seems hopelessly vague 
and abstract. 
Furthermore, readers may believe that B aker has contented himself with 
doing the easy work of launching a negative critique without doing the hard 
work of offering positive proof. If B aker believes that significant and dan­
gerous media concentration exists, then he must prove it. Of course, this 
would require him to engage in the preliminary project of appropriately de­
fining the media, just as he requires of Compaine. Such an undertaking, 
however, would compel B aker to acknowledge the place of new media in 
the current distribution of communicative power. Rather than contending 
with this challenge, offering his own definition of media, and then marshal­
ing data to show that media ownership concentration exists, Baker limits 
himself to an attack on Compaine's model. This may strike readers as an 
evasion. And this is particularly true for readers who harbor the suspicion 
that the existence of new media undercuts Baker's scarcity-based arguments 
in ways he either does not understand or prefers to avoid discussing. Regret­
tably, B aker's next point reinforces this suspicion. 
B .  Contending with New Media 
Baker next addresses the argument that media concentration does not, 
indeed cannot, result in disproportionate power because of the internet (p. 
1 8. P. 59; see also pp. 65-72. 
1 9. P. 59; see also pp. 72-76. 
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97). Some scholars have maintained that the internet has lowered or elimi­
nated economic barriers to the expansive distribution of information and to 
competition in the media marketplace.20 Baker acknowledges that "[t]he 
internet undoubtedly has transformative effects on the public sphere that 
potentially-or already-have great political and democratic significance" 
(p. 98). Still, he suggests that "these particular developments have no bear­
ing on any debate about the dangers or objections to media ownership 
concentration" (p. 99), and he raises both empirical and theoretical argu­
ments in support of his position. 
B aker argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the 
internet has meaningfully increased competition within media. He maintains 
that "traditional news and cultural media continue to dominate . . .  in per­
forming (even if inadequately) their traditional roles" (p. 100). Further, he 
notes that "[m]ost of the most heavily used news sites turn out to be owned 
by offline brands and seldom add significant new journalistic resources" (p. 
1 12). And he contends that high levels of audience concentration continue to 
occur-and continue to increase-within the universe of nontraditional in­
ternet content providers, such as biogs. In other words, despite the vast 
choices offered by the internet, most people gravitate toward a fairly limited 
number of sites (pp. 106-1 1 ). 
The difficulty with Baker's empirical analysis is one he acknowledges 
and for which he cannot be faulted: things change quickly in the online 
world. Thus, after reciting some data about blogging, Baker observes that 
his numbers will surely be out of date by time they are read (p. 106). And 
after explaining why the evidence suggests that the internet actually concen­
trates public attention on communications provided by a few owners, Baker 
concedes that, "[o]f course, all this could change" (p. 1 13). The fragility of 
the existing empirical data prompts Baker to put aside the question of 
whether the internet decreases or increases concentration and to ask instead 
whether it alleviates "the reasons to be concerned about concentration" (p. 
1 1 3) .  Baker concludes it does not. 
Baker ingeniously-some might maintain too ingeniously-argues that 
the success of online news providers may actually exacerbate the problems 
inherent in media concentration. Baker points out that if internet news sites 
generate less revenue than traditional media, then a consumer shift to online 
news would reduce the resources available to support "serious commercial 
journalism" (p. 1 1 6) .  Furthermore, Baker contends, "there is little reason to 
think that in the near term . . .  the new noncommercial, volunteer-supported 
online news ventures will provide an adequate substitute for traditional pro­
fessional journalism" (p. 1 1 9). Finally, Baker argues that "despite the 
changes wrought by the internet, a small handful of companies may con­
tinue to supply most of the financial resources for journalism (or cultural 
creation) and to control most of the audience attention" (p. 1 2 1) .  Baker thus 
finds that the existence of the internet does not eliminate the evils he sees in 
20. See, e.g., BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: 
COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY (3d ed. 2000). 
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media-ownership concentration-an undemocratic imbalance of expressive 
power and a decline in quality reporting-are not eliminated (or even mean­
ingfully reduced). He therefore dismisses the "misguided invocation of the 
internet as a total solution to . . .  the problem of concentration" as faddish 
and intellectually sloppy (p. 123). 
At this point, however, a number of tensions seem to emerge within 
Baker's text. The book begins by invoking the importance of the democratic 
distribution of communicative power, but Baker's discussion of the most 
powerfully democratizing distribution system in the history of the planet has 
a decidedly, almost absurdly, dismissive quality. The book rejects antitrust 
analysis and all other brands of "commodity" thinking about speech, but 
Baker's embrace of traditional journalistic quality may strike the reader as 
elitist and heavily commodity oriented. The book acknowledges the empiri­
cal uncertainty about the current effects and future impact of the internet, 
but Baker seems to express his conclusions in a much more strident and 
confident manner than such a context would suggest is appropriate. Baker 
also has a larger problem: most readers of this book will have some famili­
arity with the anguish newspaper publishers have expressed over their 
declining circulation numbers and loss of audience to the internet. It seems 
early in the day to predict what all this means, but it seems late in the day to 
maintain that nontraditional internet content does not pose a serious com­
petitive challenge to traditional media. 
It is at this point that I believe Baker's book loses a great deal of its per­
suasive force and credibility. Baker's entire argument necessarily rests on 
the proposition that a problem exists that is sufficiently definable, signifi­
cant, and persistent to warrant a substantial change in policy. But the 
internet and the new modes of communication that flow through it put all of 
this into play. In the current situation, even the basic task of defining the 
media poses profound challenges. Assessing the existence and significance 
of concentration becomes a daunting, perhaps impossible, task. And at­
tempting to formulate policy aimed at such a rapidly moving target seems 
quixotic and ill-advised. The reader may be left with the impression that 
Baker's book either comes too late, because the scarcity-based media model 
he employs has become a quaint memory, or too early, because we do not 
yet understand the impact of the internet on the issue of media-ownership 
concentration. In either event, readers are likely to conclude that the time is 
out of joint for Baker's thesis. 
C. Regulation in the Interest of Freedom 
In the fourth chapter of his book, Baker seeks to rebut claims that the 
regulation of media ownership conflicts with the constitutional protection 
afforded freedom of speech. He bases his rebuttal on two main points: ( 1 )  
that the ultimate beneficiary of press freedom should b e  the general public, 
not media owners, and (2) that governmental restrictions on media owner-
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ship facilitate, rather than undermine, the aims of the First Amendment.21 
But Baker's arguments do not withstand analysis. Courts do not draw a clear 
dividing line between First Amendment protection for media owners and 
protection for others, nor should they. Furthermore, it seems odd to suggest 
that allowing the government a greater hand in restricting the media will 
somehow facilitate media freedom-particularly the freedom to criticize the 
government. In advancing his theory of the First Amendment, Baker asks 
the reader to join him in a collection of views and assumptions that seem 
debatable at best. 
1 .  Media Owners as Beneficiaries of First Amendment Protection 
Baker first argues that, while constitutional rights are commonly under­
stood as existing to benefit the individual rights holder, the appeal of this 
approach breaks down in the case of media entities (pp. 1 30-3 1 ). He con­
tends that "[i]t is a logical mistake . . .  to treat [a] press entity-the overt 
rights holder-as [we would treat] an individual" because "[a]ttributing ul­
timate or inherent moral significance to legal structures-to institutions-is, 
at best, perverse" (p. 1 3 1 ) .  Baker maintains that it makes no sense to restrain 
ourselves from making policy choices that "further the collective welfare" in 
order to benefit "legally created institutions whose significance presumably 
lies in the service of society" (p. 1 3 1  ) .  
To support his argument, Baker distinguishes individual freedom from 
press freedom. In Baker's view, the former seeks to benefit the individual 
rights holder by providing her or him with a sphere of expressive liberty 
inviolate from governmental interference. This freedom is an end in itself 
(pp. 1 30, 1 33). The latter, in contrast, seek to preserve the media's instru­
mental and structural role as the fourth estate-the institution within our 
democracy that persuades, struggles against, and exposes the "other 
branches" (p. 132). This freedom is a means to other ends. As such, he ar­
gues, press freedom should be subject to regulation (such as ownership 
restrictions) that facilitates its functional role (pp. 13 1-38). 
Baker's argument is interesting but unsatisfying for several reasons. 
First, the bright line Baker attempts to draw between individual and press 
freedom does not map to reality. Baker classifies individuals as those with 
moral significance and press entities as those without. But the speech of 
media entities, like the speech of individuals, reflects exercises of moral . d 22 JU gment. 
Indeed, media entities commonly take positions regarding, and wield 
immense influence concerning, the critical moral issues of our day. Casting 
these voices as impersonal abstractions certainly makes regulation seem 
2 1 .  Pp. 1 27-28. Baker further maintains that this second premise makes sense only in con­
nection with a third, i.e., that judges should be active in reviewing and second guessing political 
judgments about the proper structure of the media industry. 
22. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 4 1 8  U.S. 241 ( 1974), can be read to support 
this proposition. Baker argues that the Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 5 1 2  
U.S. 622 ( 1 994), repudiates any such interpretation. Pp. 1 35-37. 
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more palatable-an instinct Baker feeds by alluding to telephone compa­
nies, cable systems, and expansive media entities like Time Warner, News 
Corporation, and Clear Channel (p. 1 30). But his approach seems less ap­
pealing if we think instead of the New Yorker, the National Review, 
Commentary, the Christian Century, the publications of the Sierra Club and 
the Audubon Society, or the editorial pages of the New York Times and the 
Wall Street Journal. 
In this respect, Baker's approach may remind the reader of the stubborn 
but largely unworkable distinction between commercial and non­
commercial speech. The Supreme Court's attempt to separate speech into 
these two categories, and to assign differing values to those categories, has 
resulted in a jurisprudence of conspicuous incoherence. Baker's effort to 
divide speakers into two categories, and to assign them distinctive roles and 
differing protections based on that categorization, appears no better able to 
accommodate the inconvenient messiness of how the world actually works. 
Even if we accept the distinction, problems remain. After all, the press 
has the ability to check governmental power-that is, to serve its instrumen­
tal and structural role-primarily because of its independence and freedom. 
Yet Baker argues for greater governmental control over the media-indeed, 
over nothing less than the critical issue of ownership. And, perhaps even 
more curiously, Baker contends that the government would exercise this 
control by fostering policies that would better position the media to struggle 
against and expose the government's own failings. It seems at least as plau­
sible that the goal of media independence from government would be best 
served by media independence from government. 
2. Government Regulation of Media Owners and the First Amendment 
Baker next turns to his argument that restricting media ownership does 
not undermine the aims of the First Amendment. Returning to his earlier 
themes, Baker again discounts what he describes as the commodity-oriented 
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, where the aim of the First Amend­
ment is to avoid laws that "reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
speech" (p. 143). This metaphor, Baker reiterates, "simply does not engage 
the democratic values underlying press freedom" (p. 145). 
This leads Baker into a consideration of various theories of democracy 
(pp. 146-47), each of which, he acknowledges, "has different implications 
for the democratic rationale for press freedom and for the constitutionality 
or desirability of restricting ownership concentration" (p. 147). Without 
much discussion, Baker embraces what he labels as a theory of "complex 
democracy,"23 which he says cannot resolve "on principle" questions "about 
23. Baker defines "complex democracy" to mean democracy that "involves a complex mix­
ture of republican and liberal discourses." P. 1 46. His concept of complex democracy also 
"emphasizes the importance of subgroups' cultural, self-definitional discourses, as well as strategic 
discourses internal to subgroups." P. 147. 
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the ideal amount and content of regulation"24 of media concentration. He 
maintains that because these questions are heavily empirical, and thus "no 
clear abstract (constitutional) principle[]" can determine which policies are 
best, courts should leave them to legislative judgments (p. 148). Baker thus 
seems to argue that the First Amendment has nothing to say about limita­
tions on press ownership. 
I respect the ambitious breadth of Baker's vision, but I think he asks a 
great deal of the reader here. As I understand it, the analytic steps proceed as 
follows:  
We must accept the proposition that the Constitution guarantees press 
freedom in order to achieve structural and instrumental aims-but is indif­
ferent to the "quantity, quality, and diversity of speech" (p. 143). This poses 
two challenges. First, we must think it is necessary to choose between these 
two sets of values rather than embracing them both. Second, we must reject 
a marketplace of ideas model that has a long tradition, intuitive appeal, and 
1 . d 25 at east some support m prece ent. 
Next, we must favor a model of complex democracy over all others­
and we must do so on the strength of two pages of analysis of the competing 
visions. And then we must accept the proposition that, because the chosen 
democratic model does not yield a principle that dictates "the ideal amount 
and content of regulation" (p. 148), concentration of media ownership does 
not raise a question of constitutional significance and should be left to legis­
lative judgments. The last step, which appears to imply that when the 
Constitution cannot speak precisely it does not speak at all, may strike the 
reader as particularly puzzling. 
Baker's book has considerable richness and density here. His argument 
is challenging, and I readily acknowledge I may have failed to follow it suc­
cessfully. Still, it seems fair to observe that Baker demands more of his 
audience than his argument requires. It would appear that all Baker really 
needs to establish is that the sorts of ownership regulations he thinks advis­
able do not raise constitutional concerns. That, of course, requires him to 
offer a set of specific policy recommendations, which leads us to his final 
chapters. 
24. P. 1 48. In Chapter Five of his book, Baker states that "[C]hapter 4 emphasizes a theory of 
complex democracy that had been only marginally discussed in [C]hapter I ." P. 1 63. Baker's desig­
nation of complex democracy as a linchpin of his argument seems peculiar in light of the fact that 
his discussion of it occupies only four paragraphs. Pp. 1 46-47. Readers might reasonably expect a 
deeper and more robust discussion of why this theory, which plays such a central role in the argu­
ment, deserves our allegiance. 
25. This includes recent precedent. Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In that case, the Court endorsed the principle that a university has a 
compelling interest in admitting a diverse student body and can therefore consider the race of an 
applicant as one of many factors in making admissions decisions. Although the case arose in a Four­
teenth Amendment context, the Court's analysis of the compelling interest in question turns on the 
model of the First Amendment that Baker seems to reject-a model that aims to achieve a market­
place of ideas rich in quantity, quality, and diversity. 
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Ill. BAKER'S PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
In the final section of his book, Baker advances seven policy proposals, 
which vary in their breadth and novelty (p. 1 63). In my view, this is the least 
effective section of Baker's book, for two fundamental reasons. First, this 
section assumes that Baker has established the existence of a serious prob­
lem requiring serious solutions. For the reasons discussed above, however, I 
do not believe he has done so. Certainly, the book fails to make the case em­
pirically. Likewise, his theoretical arguments suffer from too many faults. 
Second, if we assume that he has established the existence of such a prob­
lem, then it is reasonable for us to expect that he will propose solutions that 
will possess certain characteristics-for example, that they will be realistic, 
that they will be specific enough to understand and evaluate, and that they 
will be consistent with his diagnosis of the problem and with each other. 
Unfortunately, Baker's proposed solutions do not meet these standards. 
Baker begins by proposing a "somewhat different and more muscular 
enforcement" of antitrust laws (p. 1 7 1). This seems an odd out-of-the-blocks 
suggestion. After all, earlier in his book Baker argues that antitrust law does 
not take account of the most significant issues raised by media-ownership 
concentration-including his three non-commodity-oriented reasons for 
opposing it. It is difficult to understand how the "more muscular" use of 
such an allegedly ill-fitting legislative scheme would do much good or make 
such sense. His joint call for a "somewhat different" approach to antitrust 
law might compensate for this if it offered more specifics, but his argument 
here amounts to a fairly vague urging of "media-specific regulation" (p. 
1 72). Baker's candor in acknowledging that antitrust laws constitute an "in­
sufficient response" (p. 1 73) makes the text somewhat more consistent, but 
it does little to mitigate the sense that this is a strange place for him to start. 
Baker's second proposal seems just as peculiar. Baker suggests 
"[r]equiring pre-merger review, combined with media-specific conditions or 
presumptions against approval, possibly carried out by two different agen­
cies using different criteria" (p. 174). He observes that in the United States 
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act26 already requires governmental pre-merger re­
view of most large combinations (p. 173), and that some foreign countries 
"impose a special, stricter review process or . . .  apply different analyses in 
the media context" (p. 174). 
Still, Baker notes that these pre-merger laws have accomplished little­
by which he means they have precluded very few ownership changes (p. 
1 74). He suggests that the reason may be that these laws tend to leave con­
siderable discretion in the hands of governmental officials, and exercises of 
discretion are subject to manipulation (pp. 1 74-75). He therefore raises the 
possibility that the adoption of "clear standards that embody a strong pre­
sumption against mergers could increase the chances of obtaining 
meaningful results" (p. 1 74). 
26. 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 8(a) (2006). 
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This proposal does not do much for Baker's argument. It seems vague 
and speculative: it alludes to unarticulated "clear standards" and hypothe­
sizes about what "could" follow from them if adopted. It also seems 
halfhearted: the tone and word choice of this section of the book suggest 
that Baker harbors considerable skepticism about the efficacy of this pro­
posal. 27 Again, it will probably strike many readers as odd that Baker would 
choose so ambiguous and tenuous a proposal as one of his "up front" policy 
recommendations. 
Baker's third proposal offers what he describes as an "ideal media mer­
ger policy" (p. 178). He suggests that such a policy would be driven by two 
principles: ( 1 )  media entities could be sold only to buyers who after the sale 
would own no more media properties than the seller did before the sale, and 
(2) any for-profit media entity buyer would have to receive the majority of 
its post-purchase revenue from its media business (p. 178). This third pro­
posal seems much more consistent with Baker's arguments than the first 
two. It moves away from antitrust law and economics. And it moves toward 
an absolute ban on any merger that would increase concentration of media 
ownership or that would place media entities in the hands of non-media cor­
porations. 
But Baker cannot quite bring himself to stake out this extreme a posi­
tion. He therefore acknowledges-grudgingly and skeptically-that such a 
stringent rule might preclude some mergers that would "produce benefits for 
the communications order and for the public" (p. 179). This leaves room for 
the possibility that "an alternative might be to allow waivers . . .  when the 
applying purchaser can show clearly and concretely why allowing the pur­
chase would benefit the public" (p. 179). Baker deserves credit for 
recognizing that the specific facts of individual cases can play havoc with 
bright-line rules. Nevertheless, his concession may trouble readers who be­
lieve that waivers are subject to the same discretionary abuses Baker 
identified in discussing his second proposal.28 
Baker's fourth proposal is that Congress should adopt a law that allows 
the purchase of a media entity only if the continuing editorial independence 
of that entity is guaranteed (p. 1 8 1 ) . Baker here borrows an idea from the 
Newspaper Preservation Act,29 under which newspapers that consolidate 
their business operations must keep their editorial functions separate. And 
he extends this principle-perhaps to the breaking point-by urging that the 
proposed law should protect journalistic employees from dismissal except 
for cause and should provide them with the power to veto dismissal of their 
editor under most circumstances (p. 1 8 1) .  
27. For example, Baker cautions that "[t]he British and German experiences . . .  warn against 
expecting too much." P. 1 74. 
28. Indeed, some readers may wonder whether Baker's argument has a kind of circularity to 
it: we can embrace clear standards and bright-line rules because they will be subject to reasonable 
exceptions; but we need not fear those exceptions because in applying them we will refer to clear 
standards and bright-line rules. 
29. 1 5  U.S.C. §§ 1 80 1-1 804. 
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Some will think this proposal does not go far enough. There is some­
thing to this: the principle of editorial independence does not, in and of 
itself, prevent many activities that may work against the democratic distribu­
tion of communicative power.30 Others will think his proposal goes too far. 
There is something to this as well: the legal and empirical support for this 
approach seems thin, and Baker's invocation of such authorities as the Nor­
wegian Press Association Code of Ethics does little to bolster his claim that 
his suggestion is "not . . .  unprecedented" (p. 1 8 1) .  Still others will object 
that this proposal goes in the wrong direction-at least by Baker's own 
reckoning. And there is something to this, too: it seems odd for Baker to rely 
so heavily on a principle-editorial independence-that relates so closely to 
such commodity-oriented notions as the quantity, quality, and diversity of 
the voices that enter the marketplace of ideas. 
Baker's fifth proposal is that "mergers or ownership changes could be 
conditioned on approval by the journalistic, creative, and editorial employ­
ees . . .  of a media entity" (p. 1 82). He argues that, because such employees 
would typically "oppose mergeres [sic] that they believe would degrade the 
entities' journalistic or creative roles," the sales they approve would tend to 
have positive, or at least neutral, effects on "the media order" (p. 1 82). 
Baker acknowledges the objection that such a rule would take from the 
owners and give to the employees "a potentially valuable right generally 
connected with ownership" (p. 1 82). But Baker responds by pointing out 
that this redistribution of power serves egalitarian ends as well as the inter­
est in preserving media quality (p. 1 83). 
Baker certainly casts his drama with starkly drawn actors. In this play, 
owners care single-mindedly about profit margins and give no thought to 
quality, while journalists deeply value their "creative roles" and would not 
use their newly granted veto power to exact concessions that serve their per­
sonal interests rather than those of "the media order" (pp. 1 77-78). Readers 
may wonder whether these convenient bad-guy/good-guy role descriptions 
have much to do with reality. I have represented media entities and journal­
ists for more than twenty years and, in my experience, reality is 
considerably more complicated. 
Perhaps Baker is right---or at least right on average---or perhaps not. 
What is certain is that he proposes to place an extraordinary burden on me­
dia entities: he would deprive them of a common right of ownership and he 
would impose on them a cost of doing business (a tax, if you will) that other 
businesses do not bear. Curiously, he would do all this as a consequence of 
the favored status of the media under our Constitution. Such extraordinary 
measures call for extraordinarily powerful arguments and extraordinarily 
compelling evidence. Readers may reasonably question whether Baker has 
provided them. My own view is that he has not. 
Baker's sixth and seventh proposals are his most vague. His sixth ad­
vances the idea of subsidizing smaller media. He begins by noting that the 
30. For example, editorial independence would not prevent one media entity from acquiring 
another simply in order to shutter it and eliminate the competition. 
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government subsidizes the media in a wide variety of ways, from granting 
special postal rates to holding press conferences. He then argues that "de­
mocratic theory clearly suggests the merits of considering tax benefits or 
actual subsidies to support ownership diversity" (p. 1 85). Baker notes in 
passing the potential for "greater estate tax exemptions [that] could favor 
continuance of the remaining family media enterprises" (p. 186), and even 
alludes to the possibility of "the government [providing] operating funds to 
financially weaker [news]papers" (p. 186), but offers nothing more specific. 
His seventh proposal advances the idea of imposing special responsibili­
ties on large media firms. Again, he avoids specifics: "Special obligations 
might be imposed on papers with market penetration levels above a certain 
level" (p. 1 87). He mentions the possibility of "[r]equiring nondiscrimina­
tory access to advertising space for views on matters of public importance" 
(p. 1 88), but otherwise does not flesh out what he has in mind. In sum, 
Baker's sixth and seventh proposals raises provocative ideas, but do so in 
such a general manner that readers may conclude they do not have a firm 
grasp on what he is proposing, let alone whether it makes any sense. 
Baker describes his proposals as "gutsy," (p. 202) but readers may not 
share this assessment. They are more likely to find some of his proposals 
modest, some vague, and some ambitious and intriguing but insufficiently 
supported. To Baker's credit, they are also likely to find many of his propos­
als interesting invitations into further contemplation. In my opinion, 
however, truly gutsy proposals would offer greater detail and would marshal 
greater empirical support. Of course, that would make them more vulnerable 
to questioning and counterargument, but then that's where the guts come in. 
The inconsistencies, ambiguities, and uncertainties that haunt this sec­
tion of the book are regrettable because they detract from the force of some 
of the points that Baker makes earlier. Even those who accept Baker's ar­
gument that media concentration exists and requires a remedy may feel 
disappointed by his suggestions about how to address the problem. To bor­
row a phrase from T.S. Eliot, this section ends the book not with a bang but 
with a whimper, which disserves the provocative thinking that precedes it. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Review, I have raised numerous objections, varying in their scope 
and significance, to the arguments set forth in Baker's book. In my view, 
however, the greatest failing of Media Concentration and Democracy is that 
it does not engage broadly and deeply with the question of whether the de­
velopment of new media has fundamentally changed the vehicles for the 
communication of information-and thereby largely disposed of the very 
problem Baker seeks to address. To the contrary, his treatment of new media 
seems superficial, dismissive, and disconnected from the current realities of 
communications dynamics. 
This is such an important failing because so many of Baker's arguments 
rest on explicit or implicit scarcity rationales.  Indeed, a fair summary of his 
central thesis would be that there are only so many media to go around, and 
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we must therefore make sure they go around fairly. The universe of new 
media-incompletely understood, explored, or even imagined-makes this 
thesis seem dated. Indeed, the pervasive influence of new media will leave 
some readers with the impression that Baker has set about the confused task 
of attempting to ration an infinite resource. I think Baker's book never quite 
recovers from this stumble. That is unfortunate, because in many other re­
spects Media Concentration and Democracy is an intriguing and thought­
provoking book. 
In another intriguing and thought-provoking book,31 Robert McChesney 
raises arguments that are in some respects similar to those raised by Baker 
in Media Concentration and Democracy. And, in a review of McChesney's 
book, Carlin Romano voices some of the same objections articulated here. 32 
Still, Romano concludes his review by citing a passage from McChesney's 
book and observing, "Over the top, sure, but it makes you think."33 
Baker's book deserves a rather similar assessment. At various moments 
Media Concentration and Democracy is expansive, incremental, radical, 
modest, straightforward, ambiguous, thoughtful, hopelessly abstract, deep, 
superficial, under the radar, and over the top. Sure, but it makes you think. 
Or, as the collegiate coffee-slinger so aptly put it, "The guy has a lot of 
ideas." Some readers will find that enough. Others may wish for a good deal 
more. 
3 1 .  ROBERT MCCHESNEY, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND THE 
FUTURE OF MEDIA (2007). 
32. Carlin Romano, Big Fish and Small Fry, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 
47 (reviewing ROBERT MCCHESNEY, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND 
THE FUTURE OF MEDIA (2007)). 
33. Id. at 50. 
